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e ne
any US industries have felt the heavy hand of
deregulation over the past twenty years; telephones, airlines, trucking and natural gas to
name a few. However, electric power was long
felt to be too much a “natural monopoly” to face the deregulation process. Well, those days are over.. .
The electric power industry is undergoing major changes,

L-power
blackout of 1965, utilities began to interconnect.
Interconnection yielded many advantages.
Reliability was improved since neighboring
systems could act as buffer zones and provide
additional power during fault conditions. Many
power companies worked cooperatively together to avert power failures.
Additionally, utilities would buy and sell
power across the interconnections, or tie lines.
Frequently, a utility would produce excess power
and sell it at a cheaper price than a neighbor could
produce it. Thus, both companies profited from
this arrangement. Currently, the flow of electric
power through parts of the network is closely
coordinated between utilities. For many decades,
it was felt that having a single company own a
region’s transmission and distribution systems
and generation, under tight regulation, was more
efficient than competition.

How things will change

fig. I Power system structure

both politically and technically. They are a result of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) Orders 888 and 889
issued in 1996. These orders essentially deregulate the transmission network, allowing producers and customers access to the
network for electricity transactions.
One justification for this deregulation is to level the considerable differences in price of a kWh (lulowatt-hour) of electrical energy across the United States and Canada. Average
residential costs vary from 5.0 cents per kwh in Washington
state to 13.6 cents per kwh in New York. what is overlooked,
however, is that this cost is not just for generating the electricity. Currently, a considerable excess of power exists in the US
The cost differences primarily lie in transmitting this power
from its origin to the place of demand.

How it has been working
To better understand the effect deregulation will have on the US
power system, we must look at how electric utilities currently
operate. A typical power system confguration is shown in Fig.
1. In current and past operations, the utilities were vertically
integrated as shown by the dashed box. A single utility would
own and operate all components necessary for providing service
to their customers, from generation, through transmission, down
to the distribution system. Customers received one bill from
their utility company for the entire service. Historically, a single
utility would service a geographic region. The utility was responsible for providing enough generation to meet all of their customers’ needs. However, after the infamous New York City
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Deregulation will essentially turn the dashed
boxes in Fig. 1 on their sides. As deregulation
proceeds, these entities will no longer exist in
close collaboration within a single utility. Indeed,
it is forecasted that distinct industries may arise
which specialize in only one of these areas: a
GenCo. (generation), a TransCo. (transmission),
or a Disco. (distribution). Competition will
replace cooperation. Competition, however, will
spur technological growth.
How is this deregulation being accomplished?
The new FERC orders have forced utilities to
give “open access” to their transmission system
to both suppliers of power and consumers. What
this means is that, like the sidewalk in front of
your house, anyone who chooses to may use it.
And, secondly, consumers are no longer constrained to purchase their power from the regional utility. They can shop around for the best price.
These two initiatives, taken together, will change
the face of how electric power has traditionally
been produced and transmitted.
The impact on the network will be that certain transmission corridors may be forced to
carry more power than they were designed
for. The results will be a myriad of technical
difficulties such as decreased reliability (ability to serve the demand), decreased power
quality (harmonics and transients), and
increased wear and tear on system equipment.
An excellent example are the blackouts that
affected western US and Canada in July and
August of 1996. Both blackouts were exacerbated by unscheduled power flows along the
North-South coastal corridors.

For example, in August 1996, California was suffering through a
heat wave. Large amounts of electric power were shipped along
two parallel tie h e s (one AC and one DC line) from the northwest, south to the heavily populated areas of California. However, since electrical current will take the path of least impedance,
not all of the current flowed through the desired corridor. As
some current took a circuitous route (called a “loop flow”), the
transmission lines over which the extraneous power flowed
began to overload. This happened because they were not
designed to carry such large amounts of current.
As they overloaded, they began to heat up due to the large
amount of FR (resistive) losses. As they heated up, the lines
expanded and began to sag. Finally, one line sagged enough to
make contact with a tree, thus causing a short circuit to ground.
As this line was removed from service, the current was then
shunted in greater amounts over the remaining lines, causing
more overloads. This process continued until a cascade of cause
and effects caused the systems to break apart, or “island” in order
to retain coverage to as many customers as possible. While this
caused a catastrophic failure, there are many more similar close
calls that do not receive media attention.

Cooperation vs revenues
To better visualize this phenomenon, consider Fig. 2a. This
shows two systems connected via two tie lines. Under normal
operation, the two generators of system A provide power to the
load (all loads are denoted by-) within the system over its own
lines. The same holds for system B. There is no net interchange
on the tie lines between A and B. However, if system A loses
one of its internal lines as shown in Fig. 2b, power will inadvertently flow over the lines of system B.
There are several ramifications here. First, system B now has
the burden of the excess wear and tear on the network equipment.
In addition, system B cannot make any transactions that would
increase the loading on its line any more. So, from the cooperative
standpoint, the reliability of the system has been increased, since
system A was able to maintain service. However, from the competitive standpoint, system B has lost system capacity, and therefore potential revenues.
The F%RC orders have required systems to place a dollar figure on each transmission corridor, so utilities may charge for
such transgressions. Utilities are required to post these costs and
their predicted available transfer capacity on a World Wide Web
site called OASIS. These costs must cover not only the actual
cost of transmission, but also such intangibles as wear and tear,
security capacity limits, and decreased reliability of service.

What will happen
Predicting available transfer capacity is an extremely m c u l t task.
In any given transfer of power, most of the power will flow over
the predicted corridor. However, there is always a finite amount of
power that will take a more circuitous route. Utilities, whose network this power flows over, will want to charge for the usage of
their lines. Thus, they are working to improve their data collection
and processing.
More serious, though, is that transmission lines have limits.
Transfer capacity is govemed by a number of factors, not just
physical current carrying capacity. There are limits which are
imposed by stability constraints. Too much power across a particular line could result in generators pulling out of synchronism. This
is manifested by large oscillations in power. Or a phenomenon
called voltage collapse can result; the voltage in the system slowly

declines until it suddenly drops, with little or no warning. The
power system will be pushed to the limits of its capability. Unfortunately, this limit is not usually known ahead of time.

Results that will require attention
Obviously, first off, better prediction and detection of these stability limits is going to be required under deregulation.Another cure
for the woes the public is about to face is to add more transmission capacity.
This solution, however, will not typically be a viable option.
Recent bids to add more tsdnsmission have met public and Environmental Protection Agency (ITA) resistance. Most of the public lives
with a “not in my backyard” mentality when it comes to transmission lines. There is also the concem over deleterious effects from
things such as electromagnetic fields. Many utilities will be leery
about undertaking such a major capital cost endeavor as well.
The charge consumers see on their monthly bills is not only
the actual cost of generation, but also the amortized cost of past
investments in infrastructure. Few utilities are going to invest in
new equipment when that cost will be added to the price they will
have to charge. This amortized cost of equipment has left many
utilities with “stranded assets.” These are assets, such as nuclear
power plants which cost billions of dollars to build. Those costs
have been built into the rate structure the utility uses. Until these
t
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Fig. 2 Loop flow between WOsystems
investments are paid off, the cost of electricity from that company
will not drop. Even though, for example, nuclear power is one of
the cheapest generation per kwh available.Many utilities fear that
they will be unable to pay for these large past expenditures, since
customers will abandon them for a cheaper competitor.
A similar argument can be made about pollution. Strict clean
air standards in heavily populated areas, such as the northeast and
California, have forced coal-fired plants to be fitted with expensive
filters, or “scrubbers.” These expenditures, too, have been factored
into the companies’ price rates. However, under deregulation, consumers in these areas could contract with producers in the midwest, who do not have to abide by the same strict standards, to
generate their power. (But shipping this power over long distances
still leads to the difficulties in transmission discussed previously.)
These are all political and technical challenges yet to be solved.
There is a world of opportunity out there for power engineers willing to tackle some of these problems. The US grid will certainly
face growing pains, and probably a short term decrease in reliability. However, solutions to make the system more economic and
reliable than before are sure to come about.
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